Are Chatbots leading to increasing mental health issues for adolescents?

After August 31, 2025, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission issued orders to several major AI-chatbot and social-media companies seeking information about how their companion chatbots affect children and teenagers.

The FTC’s post-August 2025 inquiry into AI companion chatbots was prompted in part by concerns that minors may form emotionally dependent relationships with chatbots or receive unsafe mental-health-related responses from them.

After August 31, 2025, California enacted a law specifically regulating AI companion chatbots and requiring safeguards for users who express suicidal ideation or self-harm intent.

California’s post-August 2025 AI companion chatbot law requires covered chatbot operators to disclose to users that they are interacting with an AI system rather than a human being.

California’s post-August 2025 AI companion chatbot law bans all chatbot use by minors under 18.

After August 31, 2025, OpenAI announced additional teen-safety measures for ChatGPT, including parental controls and stronger handling of conversations involving self-harm or suicide risk.

OpenAI’s post-August 2025 teen-safety announcements were partly a response to public concern and litigation alleging that ChatGPT contributed to a teenager’s suicide.

After August 31, 2025, OpenAI stated that it would try to route some emotionally sensitive or self-harm-related conversations to models designed to follow safety instructions more reliably.

After August 31, 2025, OpenAI announced a plan to notify parents in some situations when a teen user appears to be in acute distress.

After August 31, 2025, Meta announced additional restrictions on how teen users can interact with its AI chatbots, including limits on romantic, sexual, or self-harm-related conversations.

After August 31, 2025, Meta publicly stated that it would remove or restrict some user-created AI characters that were inappropriate for teen users.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, public officials in the United States increased scrutiny of AI companion chatbots as a youth mental-health and child-safety issue.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, high-profile lawsuits and complaints continued to allege that AI companion chatbots encouraged or failed to prevent adolescent self-harm.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, the public evidence base still did not include a definitive large-scale longitudinal study proving that chatbot use is causing a population-wide increase in adolescent mental-health disorders.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, the strongest new evidence about chatbot-related adolescent mental-health risk consisted largely of regulatory actions, company safety changes, lawsuits, incident reports, and observational or survey evidence rather than settled causal proof.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, no major AI company announced that it would completely prohibit teenagers from using general-purpose chatbots.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, the main policy concern shifted toward AI companion chatbots that simulate friendship, romance, or therapy-like support, rather than ordinary search-style chatbot use alone.

By December 1, 2025, regulators and child-safety advocates were treating chatbot design features such as persistent memory, emotional affirmation, anthropomorphic personas, and prolonged engagement loops as potential contributors to adolescent mental-health risk.


Are civil liberties being reduced for Hong Kong residents?

After the late-November 2025 Wang Fuk Court fire in Tai Po, Hong Kong police arrested at least one person on suspicion of sedition for fire-related online speech or public advocacy.

As of December 1, 2025, the Hong Kong government had not established a judge-led statutory commission of inquiry into the Wang Fuk Court fire.

Following the late-November 2025 Wang Fuk Court fire, Hong Kong authorities suspended Legislative Council election campaigning during a mourning period.

In September 2025, Hong Kong’s Legislative Council rejected the government’s Registration of Same-sex Partnerships Bill.

As of December 1, 2025, Hong Kong had not enacted the same-sex partnership registration framework ordered by the Court of Final Appeal in 2023.

The candidate nomination process for the next Hong Kong Legislative Council election continued to require national-security or patriotism vetting by the Candidate Eligibility Review Committee.

As of December 1, 2025, Hong Kong’s Democratic Party had no approved candidates for the next Legislative Council election.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Hong Kong restored the pre-2021 system for Legislative Council elections.

As of December 1, 2025, Jimmy Lai remained in custody while awaiting a verdict in his national-security trial.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Hong Kong prosecutors withdrew all national-security charges against Jimmy Lai.

As of December 1, 2025, the convictions in the Hong Kong 47 primary-election subversion case remained in force.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Hong Kong repealed the 2020 National Security Law.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Hong Kong repealed the 2024 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance.


Are Japanese fisheries having a good year?

As of December 1, 2025, Japan's 2025 Pacific saury season was widely reported as a notable recovery from recent poor years, with larger landings and lower retail prices than in the preceding few seasons.

By December 1, 2025, Japanese consumers were paying record-high autumn prices for Pacific saury because 2025 landings had fallen below 2024 levels.

By December 1, 2025, the strong 2025 Pacific saury catch was concentrated mainly in Hokkaido and northeastern Pacific ports such as Nemuro, Kushiro, Hanasaki, and Ofunato.

As of December 1, 2025, Japan's autumn chum salmon runs and landings were still being reported as historically weak in major producing areas such as Hokkaido and northeastern Honshu.

By December 1, 2025, Japan's 2025 autumn salmon season had clearly rebounded to pre-2010s levels, making salmon one of the year's strongest bright spots for Japanese capture fisheries.

As of December 1, 2025, Japan's common squid catches remained poor in 2025, continuing the long-running decline linked to warming waters and shifting squid distribution.

By December 1, 2025, Japan's 2025 common squid season was being described as a broad-based recovery comparable to the Pacific saury rebound.

As of December 1, 2025, unusually warm seas around Japan during autumn 2025 were still being cited as a factor disrupting fish distributions and hurting some coastal fisheries.

By December 1, 2025, China had not fully restored normal, unrestricted imports of all Japanese seafood to the pre-Fukushima-water-release regime.

As of December 1, 2025, China had begun allowing some Japanese seafood imports again in 2025, but the reopening remained partial and subject to registration, inspection, and geographic restrictions.

As of December 1, 2025, Japanese seafood exports to mainland China had already returned to their pre-2023-ban levels.

As of December 1, 2025, Hokkaido scallop producers were still affected by the incomplete recovery of the Chinese market, even though Japan had diversified more shipments toward the United States, Southeast Asia, and domestic processing.

As of December 1, 2025, Japan's scallop sector had fully resolved the labor, processing, and market disruptions caused by the Chinese import ban.

By December 1, 2025, the weaker yen and high overseas seafood prices were still supportive for some Japanese seafood exporters, but did not offset weak catches across all species.

As of December 1, 2025, the 2025 recovery in Pacific saury was not enough by itself to justify saying that all Japanese fisheries were having a uniformly good year.

As of December 1, 2025, the best-supported assessment was that 2025 was a mixed year for Japanese fisheries, with a major saury rebound but continuing weakness in salmon, squid, and China-exposed export sectors.


Are new college graduates really facing an exceptionally tough job market?

The BLS Employment Situation report released on September 5, 2025 showed that nonfarm payroll employment increased by 22,000 in August 2025.

The BLS Employment Situation report released on September 5, 2025 showed that the U.S. unemployment rate was 4.3% in August 2025.

The BLS preliminary annual benchmark revision released on September 9, 2025 revised estimated March 2025 payroll employment downward by about 911,000 jobs.

The BLS preliminary annual benchmark revision released on September 9, 2025 revised estimated March 2025 payroll employment upward.

The Federal Reserve cut the target range for the federal funds rate at its September 2025 meeting.

The Federal Reserve cut the target range for the federal funds rate again at its October 2025 meeting.

The 2025 federal government shutdown delayed scheduled BLS labor-market releases in October 2025.

As of December 1, 2025, BLS had published an October 2025 unemployment rate from the household survey.

The BLS Employment Situation report for September 2025 was released after a delay caused by the federal government shutdown.

The delayed BLS Employment Situation report for September 2025 showed that nonfarm payroll employment increased by 119,000.

The delayed BLS Employment Situation report for September 2025 showed that the U.S. unemployment rate rose to 4.4%.

The delayed September 2025 BLS jobs report revised August 2025 payroll employment below zero.

No BLS Employment Situation report released between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025 showed the U.S. unemployment rate below 4.0%.

The latest available BLS data as of December 1, 2025 showed that unemployment among all workers with a bachelor’s degree or higher was lower than the overall unemployment rate.

The latest available NY Fed recent-college-graduate labor-market indicators as of December 1, 2025 showed recent college graduates had a higher unemployment rate than the overall U.S. labor force.

The latest available NY Fed recent-college-graduate labor-market indicators as of December 1, 2025 showed recent college graduates had a lower unemployment rate than older college graduates.

The latest available NY Fed recent-college-graduate labor-market indicators as of December 1, 2025 showed recent college graduate underemployment below 30%.

The latest available NY Fed recent-college-graduate labor-market indicators as of December 1, 2025 showed recent college graduate unemployment below its 2020 pandemic peak.

NACE’s fall 2025 Job Outlook 2026 survey projected a positive increase of less than 5% in employers’ hiring of the Class of 2026.

NACE’s fall 2025 Job Outlook 2026 survey projected a double-digit increase in employers’ hiring of the Class of 2026.

Handshake’s fall 2025 campus-recruiting data indicated higher application intensity among students seeking entry-level jobs than in the prior recruiting cycle.

Handshake’s fall 2025 campus-recruiting data indicated that entry-level job-search competition had returned to the unusually favorable conditions seen in 2021 and 2022.

Amazon announced in October 2025 that it would cut about 14,000 corporate jobs.

The major post-August 2025 labor-market releases strengthened the case that overall labor demand had cooled relative to the 2021-2022 hiring boom.

The major post-August 2025 labor-market releases showed a broad reacceleration in white-collar hiring for new college graduates.


Are Saudi Arabia and the UAE on good terms?

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE announced an ambassador recall, embassy closure, or suspension of bilateral relations with the other.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, Saudi and UAE official media reported direct leader-level contact between Mohammed bin Salman and Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed.

During September-November 2025, Saudi Arabia and the UAE both participated in the eight-country OPEC+ voluntary-cut group that issued joint output decisions.

The OPEC+ decision announced in early November 2025 by the group including Saudi Arabia and the UAE included a pause in further output increases for the first quarter of 2026.

During September-November 2025, the UAE publicly rejected Saudi-led OPEC+ oil policy and announced it would leave the OPEC+ voluntary-cut framework.

After Israel's September 2025 strike in Doha, Saudi Arabia and the UAE both publicly condemned the strike.

The UAE publicly supported Israel's September 2025 strike in Doha while Saudi Arabia condemned it.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE both participated after August 31, 2025 in the Sudan diplomatic Quad involving the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

By December 1, 2025, Saudi Arabia had withdrawn from the Sudan Quad process because of the UAE's alleged role in Sudan.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, Saudi Arabia announced sanctions against UAE officials or UAE entities over Sudan, Yemen, or another regional file.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, Saudi Arabia and the UAE announced a bilateral trade embargo, land-border closure, or air-travel ban against each other.

During September-November 2025, Yemen-related disagreements involving UAE-aligned southern separatists resulted in a public Saudi-UAE diplomatic rupture.

During September-November 2025, Saudi and UAE officials continued to appear together in GCC and Arab-Islamic multilateral meetings.


Are there any imminent changes to US tax law that I should be aware of?

As of December 1, 2025, Congress had not enacted an extension of the enhanced Affordable Care Act premium tax credits that are scheduled to expire after 2025.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Congress enacted a new federal law that changed the ordinary individual income tax rate brackets for tax year 2026.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, the IRS released the official inflation-adjusted federal income tax brackets and standard deduction amounts for tax year 2026.

The IRS announced after August 31, 2025 that the standard deduction for tax year 2026 is $16,100 for single filers and $32,200 for married couples filing jointly.

As of December 1, 2025, the new federal clean vehicle credits for new and used electric vehicles were no longer available for vehicles acquired after September 30, 2025.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Treasury or the IRS issued post-enactment guidance identifying occupations treated as customarily and regularly receiving tips for purposes of the new federal tip-income deduction.

As of December 1, 2025, Treasury and the IRS had issued final regulations for the new federal deductions for qualified tips and qualified overtime compensation.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, the IRS announced transition relief for 2025 information reporting related to qualified tips and qualified overtime compensation.

The new federal overtime deduction applies to all overtime wages earned by an employee rather than only to the overtime premium portion treated as overtime compensation under the statute and guidance.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, the IRS announced the 2026 contribution limits for 401(k), 403(b), governmental 457, and Thrift Savings Plan elective deferrals.

The IRS announced after August 31, 2025 that the employee elective deferral limit for 401(k), 403(b), governmental 457, and Thrift Savings Plan accounts is $24,500 for 2026.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, the IRS announced the 2026 IRA contribution limit.

The IRS announced after August 31, 2025 that the basic federal estate tax exclusion amount for estates of decedents dying in 2026 is $15,000,000.

The IRS announced after August 31, 2025 that the annual federal gift tax exclusion remains $19,000 for gifts made in 2026.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, the Social Security Administration announced that the Social Security taxable wage base will increase for 2026.

The Social Security taxable wage base for 2026 is $184,500.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, the IRS announced the 2026 health flexible spending arrangement salary-reduction limit.

The IRS announced after August 31, 2025 that the health flexible spending arrangement salary-reduction limit is $3,400 for 2026.

As of December 1, 2025, the federal residential clean energy credit and the federal energy-efficient home improvement credit were still scheduled to terminate for property placed in service after December 31, 2025.

As of December 1, 2025, Congress had enacted a new nationwide federal sales tax or value-added tax scheduled to take effect in 2026.

As of December 1, 2025, the Supreme Court had not issued a final merits decision invalidating the challenged IEEPA-based tariffs that were under review in 2025.


Are there any major AI companies on the verge of collapse?

OpenAI filed for bankruptcy protection between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

OpenAI completed a corporate restructuring in late October 2025 that placed its operating business under a public-benefit-corporation structure.

Microsoft retained a large economic stake in OpenAI under the revised OpenAI-Microsoft agreement announced in October 2025.

OpenAI announced in September 2025 a strategic partnership with Nvidia involving potential Nvidia investment of up to $100 billion tied to large-scale AI infrastructure buildout.

Oracle was reported in September 2025 to have a cloud-computing contract with OpenAI worth roughly $300 billion over several years.

OpenAI’s CFO Sarah Friar publicly suggested in November 2025 that a U.S. government backstop could help finance AI infrastructure.

Sam Altman stated in November 2025 that OpenAI was not seeking federal loan guarantees for its data centers.

Anthropic filed for bankruptcy protection between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Anthropic announced in September 2025 that it had raised about $13 billion at a post-money valuation of about $183 billion.

Anthropic agreed in September 2025 to a roughly $1.5 billion settlement of a U.S. authors’ copyright class action over pirated books used in training data.

The September 2025 Anthropic copyright settlement required Anthropic to shut down Claude.

Anthropic announced in October 2025 an expanded Google Cloud partnership giving it access to up to one million Google TPUs.

Mistral AI filed for insolvency proceedings between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Mistral AI announced in September 2025 a funding round led by ASML that valued the company at roughly €11.7 billion.

xAI laid off hundreds of data-annotation workers in September 2025.

xAI filed for bankruptcy protection between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Meta announced in October 2025 that it was cutting roughly 600 roles from its AI organization.

Meta’s October 2025 AI layoffs were accompanied by an announcement that Meta was shutting down its AI model efforts entirely.

Perplexity AI was reported in September 2025 to have raised new capital at an approximately $20 billion valuation.

Warner Bros. Discovery sued Midjourney in September 2025 alleging copyright infringement.

Midjourney entered bankruptcy protection after the Warner Bros. Discovery lawsuit.

Stability AI filed for administration or bankruptcy between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.


Are there any megaprojects in the Gulf that are likely to be completed this year?

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, the Natural History Museum Abu Dhabi opened to the public.

As of December 1, 2025, the Natural History Museum Abu Dhabi was still awaiting its first public opening.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, Abu Dhabi authorities announced a December 2025 public opening for the Zayed National Museum.

As of December 1, 2025, the Zayed National Museum had been delayed to 2026.

As of December 1, 2025, Guggenheim Abu Dhabi had opened to the public.

As of December 1, 2025, Guggenheim Abu Dhabi was scheduled for a 2025 public opening.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, Ciel Dubai Marina opened to hotel guests.

As of December 1, 2025, Wynn Al Marjan Island was scheduled to open in 2027.

As of December 1, 2025, Wynn Al Marjan Island was open to guests.

As of December 1, 2025, the Dubai Metro Blue Line was scheduled for completion in 2029.

As of December 1, 2025, the Dubai Metro Blue Line was a plausible 2025 completion candidate.

As of December 1, 2025, Etihad Rail passenger service had begun commercial operations.

As of December 1, 2025, The Red Sea destination’s full masterplan had been completed.

As of December 1, 2025, The Red Sea destination’s first phase remained a 2025 completion or opening target in public project updates.

As of December 1, 2025, AMAALA Triple Bay’s first phase had fully opened to guests.

As of December 1, 2025, Six Flags Qiddiya City was open to visitors.

As of December 1, 2025, Aquarabia Qiddiya was open to visitors.

As of December 1, 2025, NEOM Trojena was scheduled for completion in 2029.

As of December 1, 2025, NEOM Trojena was a plausible 2025 completion candidate.

As of December 1, 2025, Qatar’s North Field East LNG expansion had begun LNG exports.

As of December 1, 2025, Qatar’s North Field East LNG expansion was scheduled to deliver first LNG in 2026.


Are there any practical applications for quantum computing in the near term?

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no publicly verified quantum computer demonstrated a fault-tolerant commercial application with validated economic advantage over classical computing.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no publicly reported quantum-computing result broke RSA-2048 or another widely deployed public-key cryptosystem.

In October 2025, Google Quantum AI announced a Quantum Echoes algorithm run on its Willow superconducting quantum processor.

Google’s 2025 Quantum Echoes result was presented as a verifiable quantum-advantage experiment.

Google’s 2025 Quantum Echoes result was presented as a fully fault-tolerant quantum computation.

Google’s 2025 Quantum Echoes announcement identified scientific simulation as a prospective near-term application area for quantum computing.

Google’s 2025 Quantum Echoes announcement established a routine commercial quantum-computing service for industrial chemistry customers.

In November 2025, IBM announced a new quantum processor called IBM Quantum Nighthawk.

IBM’s November 2025 Nighthawk announcement positioned the processor as a step toward demonstrating quantum advantage before full fault tolerance.

IBM announced before December 1, 2025 that Nighthawk had delivered a production customer application with a validated classical cost advantage.

In late 2025, IBM announced an experimental processor called Loon for testing technologies relevant to fault-tolerant quantum computing.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no public announcement demonstrated enough error-corrected logical qubits for industrial-scale chemistry or materials algorithms.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no gate-model quantum computer publicly demonstrated a validated practical speedup for a live financial optimization task.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no quantum computer was publicly credited with discovering a drug that had reached regulatory approval.

After August 31, 2025, D-Wave continued to offer quantum-annealing and hybrid quantum-classical optimization services through the cloud.

After August 31, 2025, D-Wave announced that its annealing machines had become universal fault-tolerant quantum computers.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, post-cutoff quantum-computing application claims remained concentrated in benchmarking, simulation, and hybrid optimization rather than broad replacement of classical computing.


Are there any promising elder care technology startups I should look into?

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, at least one elder-care-focused technology startup announced a new equity financing round of $20 million or more.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, no elder-care-focused technology startup completed a U.S. IPO or direct listing.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Sensi.AI announced a new funding round or strategic financing event.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, SafelyYou announced a new funding round, acquisition, or major senior-living enterprise deployment.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Intuition Robotics announced a material new funding round, acquisition, shutdown, or sale affecting ElliQ.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Teton.ai announced a new funding round, U.S. expansion milestone, or major care-home customer deployment.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Birdie announced a new funding round, acquisition, or material expansion outside its existing home-care software market.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Rippl Care announced new financing, a major payer contract, or a material geographic expansion of its dementia-care model.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, DUOS announced a new financing round or a material Medicare Advantage, Medicaid, or payer partnership.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, CareYaya announced a new institutional funding round or a material expansion of its AI-enabled caregiver marketplace.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Lilli announced a new funding round or a material contract with a public-sector or large home-care customer.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, August Health announced a new funding round, acquisition, or major product expansion for senior-living operators.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Aline announced a new acquisition, financing event, or major consolidation move in senior-living software.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Papa announced a material financing, sale, shutdown, or business-model change relevant to its senior-companionship business.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, any major U.S. Medicare or CMS rule change materially expanded reimbursement for nonclinical elder-care companion robots.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, U.S. Medicare telehealth flexibilities changed in a way that materially affected virtual-care startups serving older adults.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, CMS announced a new dementia-care payment model that replaced the GUIDE Model.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, at least one elder-care technology startup announced a partnership explicitly tied to Medicare Advantage supplemental benefits or value-based care for seniors.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, at least one elder-care technology startup announced a significant regulatory, privacy, or patient-safety setback involving AI monitoring in homes or senior-living facilities.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, there was a material acquisition of an elder-care technology startup by a large healthcare, insurance, or senior-living incumbent.


Are there any verticals in which Blue Origin is leading SpaceX?

Blue Origin's second New Glenn mission launched between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Blue Origin's second New Glenn mission carried NASA's ESCAPADE Mars mission.

Blue Origin recovered a New Glenn first stage intact after an orbital launch between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Blue Origin re-flew a recovered New Glenn first stage between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Blue Origin became the second company to vertically land an orbital-class booster after an orbital launch by December 1, 2025.

SpaceX completed at least one Starship integrated flight test between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

A SpaceX Starship upper stage completed a controlled atmospheric reentry between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

SpaceX re-flew a Starship upper stage between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

SpaceX completed an in-space propellant-transfer demonstration between two Starship vehicles by December 1, 2025.

SpaceX conducted more orbital launches than Blue Origin between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Blue Origin conducted more successful orbital booster landings than SpaceX between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Blue Origin flew a crewed New Shepard mission between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

SpaceX flew a crewed suborbital tourism mission between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Blue Origin flew a crewed orbital mission between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Blue Origin launched a Blue Moon lunar lander between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

NASA transferred the Artemis III human lunar landing mission from SpaceX to Blue Origin between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

SpaceX launched an uncrewed Starship lunar-lander demonstration by December 1, 2025.

The U.S. Space Force certified New Glenn for National Security Space Launch missions by December 1, 2025.

New Glenn launched a U.S. national-security payload by December 1, 2025.

A United Launch Alliance Vulcan mission powered by Blue Origin BE-4 engines launched between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

A third-party orbital launch vehicle used SpaceX Raptor engines by December 1, 2025.

New Glenn launched an Amazon Project Kuiper satellite between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Blue Origin launched an Orbital Reef module by December 1, 2025.

NASA selected Blue Origin's Orbital Reef as the sole ISS successor between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.


Are Turkey and Israel on good terms and why?

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, Turkey and Israel did not announce a normalization agreement restoring good bilateral relations.

Turkey publicly condemned Israel’s September 2025 strike on Hamas officials in Doha as a violation of Qatar’s sovereignty.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attended the September 2025 emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha convened after Israel’s strike in Qatar.

Turkey was one of the outside actors involved in mediating the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire and hostage-release framework.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signed the October 2025 Sharm el-Sheikh Gaza declaration alongside the leaders of the United States, Egypt and Qatar.

Turkey’s role in the October 2025 Gaza diplomacy produced a bilateral rapprochement with Israel by December 1, 2025.

Israel publicly opposed the deployment of Turkish troops in a postwar Gaza stabilization force in October 2025.

Turkey publicly condemned Israel’s October 2025 interception of the Global Sumud Flotilla bound for Gaza.

Israeli authorities detained Turkish citizens after intercepting the Global Sumud Flotilla in October 2025.

Turkey treated the detention of Turkish flotilla participants by Israel as a consular and political dispute in October 2025.

In November 2025, Istanbul prosecutors issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other senior Israeli officials over alleged crimes related to Gaza.

Israel welcomed Turkey’s November 2025 arrest warrants for Israeli officials as a constructive legal step.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, Turkey and Israel announced the resumption of normal bilateral trade.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, Turkey and Israel exchanged ambassadors as part of a renewed normalization process.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, Turkish and Israeli forces engaged in a direct military clash.

By December 1, 2025, the main post-August 2025 developments pointed to continued hostility between Turkey and Israel despite Turkey’s participation in Gaza ceasefire diplomacy.


Are undergraduate CS degrees still a good choice?

In September 2025, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics released 2024–2034 employment projections that still projected computer and mathematical occupations to grow faster than the average for all occupations.

The BLS 2024–2034 projections released in September 2025 projected negative employment growth for software developers.

The BLS 2024–2034 projections released in September 2025 projected data scientist employment to grow much faster than average.

As of December 1, 2025, the BLS Occupational Outlook Handbook no longer listed a bachelor’s degree as the typical entry-level education for software developers, quality assurance analysts, and testers.

As of December 1, 2025, the BLS Occupational Outlook Handbook still listed a bachelor’s degree as the typical entry-level education for computer and information research scientists.

NACE’s fall 2025 Job Outlook 2026 materials continued to identify computer science as one of the bachelor’s degree fields most sought by U.S. employers.

NACE’s fall 2025 Job Outlook 2026 materials reported that employers had stopped recruiting computer science majors for the Class of 2026.

In October 2025, Amazon announced roughly 14,000 corporate job cuts.

The October 2025 Amazon job cuts affected only warehouse roles and not corporate roles.

In September 2025, the White House announced a $100,000 payment requirement for many new H-1B visa petitions.

As of December 1, 2025, U.S. government guidance treated the new $100,000 H-1B payment as retroactive to already approved H-1B petitions.

As of December 1, 2025, DHS had ended the STEM OPT extension for F-1 students in computer science and related fields.

As of December 1, 2025, no U.S. federal rule had eliminated Optional Practical Training for F-1 international students graduating with CS degrees.

Anthropic released Claude Sonnet 4.5 in September 2025 and marketed it as a leading model for coding and agentic computer-use tasks.

By December 1, 2025, leading AI labs had stopped releasing improved coding-oriented AI models after August 31, 2025.

OpenAI released GPT-5.1 in November 2025.

Google released Gemini 3 in November 2025.

As of December 1, 2025, post-August 2025 AI model releases had removed the need for human review of production software changes in mainstream professional software engineering practice.

As of December 1, 2025, fall 2025 labor-market reporting still described the entry-level tech market as more competitive than the 2021–2022 hiring boom.

As of December 1, 2025, there had been no post-August 2025 U.S. federal announcement making undergraduate CS degrees ineligible for STEM-designated status.


Are US companies moving their manufacturing plants to Mexico?

The United States Trade Representative initiated the public-comment process in September 2025 for the 2026 USMCA joint review.

As of December 1, 2025, the 2026 USMCA joint review had not been completed.

As of December 1, 2025, USMCA-qualifying Mexican manufactured goods had not lost duty-free treatment across the board.

As of December 1, 2025, USMCA-qualifying Mexican goods were generally exempt from the Trump administration’s broad fentanyl-related IEEPA tariffs on Mexico.

Mexico’s government proposed in September 2025 to raise tariffs on many imports from countries that do not have a free-trade agreement with Mexico.

Mexico’s September 2025 tariff proposal targeted U.S.-origin goods that qualify for USMCA treatment.

The United States imposed new Section 232 tariffs on medium- and heavy-duty trucks effective in November 2025.

The November 2025 U.S. medium- and heavy-duty truck tariff action made all truck imports from Mexico tariff-free regardless of USMCA content.

The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in November 2025 about the legality of the Trump administration’s IEEPA tariff actions.

As of December 1, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court had issued a final decision upholding the Trump administration’s IEEPA tariff actions.

Mexico’s official foreign direct investment data released after August 31, 2025 showed that the United States remained the largest source country of FDI into Mexico.

Mexico’s official January–September 2025 FDI data showed that new investment accounted for a majority of Mexico’s FDI inflows.

Mexico’s official January–September 2025 FDI data showed that manufacturing received the largest sectoral share of Mexico’s FDI inflows.

Mexico’s third-quarter 2025 GDP data released after August 31, 2025 showed a quarter-on-quarter contraction in the Mexican economy.

Tesla announced between September 1 and December 1, 2025 that construction had resumed at its planned Nuevo León Gigafactory.

Tesla began vehicle production at its planned Nuevo León Gigafactory before December 1, 2025.

Stellantis announced in October 2025 a $13 billion manufacturing investment plan for the United States.

A major Detroit automaker announced between September 1 and December 1, 2025 that it was moving final assembly of an additional U.S.-built vehicle model to Mexico.

Official data released between September 1 and December 1, 2025 established that a majority of U.S. manufacturing companies were relocating U.S. plants to Mexico.

The late-2025 Mexican FDI data supported the claim that most nearshoring-related inflows were reinvested earnings rather than brand-new plant relocations.


Are we really going to put data centers in space? And if so, when?

After August 31, 2025, Google publicly announced Project Suncatcher, a research effort focused on AI data centers in orbit.

Google said the first Project Suncatcher in-space prototype satellites were targeted for launch in early 2027.

Google selected Planet Labs as the satellite partner for the initial Project Suncatcher prototype mission.

Google had launched Project Suncatcher prototype satellites by December 1, 2025.

Google’s Project Suncatcher prototype plan involved Google TPUs rather than Nvidia H100 GPUs.

Google’s Project Suncatcher analysis identified launch cost as a central economic bottleneck for orbital AI data centers.

Google’s Project Suncatcher analysis said orbital AI data centers were already cost-competitive at 2025 launch prices.

After August 31, 2025, Starcloud announced a Starcloud-1 orbital data-center demonstrator carrying an Nvidia H100 GPU.

Starcloud’s 2025 orbital demonstrator was associated with a SpaceX rideshare mission.

Starcloud’s 2025 orbital demonstrator was a commercial hyperscale data center.

The purpose of Starcloud’s 2025 orbital demonstrator was to prove in-space AI compute.

No commercial hyperscale orbital data center was in routine service by December 1, 2025.

No megawatt-scale orbital data center was launched between August 31, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

In October 2025, Jeff Bezos publicly predicted that gigawatt-scale data centers would be built in space within 10 to 20 years.

Jeff Bezos’s October 2025 space-data-center remarks cited continuous solar power as a key advantage of orbit.

Amazon Web Services announced between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025 that it would launch a commercial orbital data-center fleet before 2030.

The major post-August 2025 developments on space data centers were prototype announcements and demonstrations rather than commitments to near-term production-scale deployment.


Does imitation learning still outperform learning in simulation for many industrial robotics tasks?

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no widely accepted public benchmark showed simulation-trained policies outperforming imitation-learned policies across a broad set of real industrial manipulation tasks.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no major industrial robot vendor announced a production deployment in which end-to-end policies trained only in simulation replaced imitation-learned policies across multiple customer sites.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, the strongest newly publicized general-purpose manipulation systems still relied substantially on human demonstrations, teleoperation data, or robot trajectory datasets.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, newly publicized simulation-to-real manipulation results for contact-rich industrial tasks still commonly required real-world calibration, adaptation, or fine-tuning.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, synthetic data from simulation was mainly presented as a complement to real demonstration data rather than as a complete replacement for imitation learning in industrial manipulation.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no post-cutoff paper or announcement established a new consensus that reinforcement learning in simulation is generally superior to imitation learning for industrial assembly, insertion, bin picking, and machine-tending tasks.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, reported successes of simulation-trained robotics policies remained more concentrated in locomotion, navigation, and constrained control than in diverse contact-rich industrial manipulation.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, high-profile humanoid or general-purpose robot demonstrations did not by themselves provide evidence that simulation-based learning outperformed imitation learning on deployed industrial tasks.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, industrial robotics companies continued to emphasize demonstrations, teach-by-demonstration interfaces, or real-world task data for learning new manipulation skills.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no new safety certification or regulatory standard made simulation-only training sufficient for validating adaptive industrial robot policies in production.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, newly released robot foundation-model work continued to use imitation-style objectives such as behavior cloning, action prediction, or video-conditioned policy learning.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no major post-cutoff result showed that improved simulators had eliminated the sim-to-real gap for deformable-object handling in industrial settings.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no major post-cutoff result showed that improved simulators had eliminated the sim-to-real gap for force-controlled precision insertion in industrial settings.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, post-cutoff evidence supported the view that simulation is valuable for pretraining, testing, and data augmentation in industrial robotics.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, post-cutoff evidence did not support the view that simulation alone had become the dominant training method for many real-world industrial manipulation deployments.


Give me a breakdown of global military spending.

As of December 1, 2025, SIPRI had not released a full-year 2025 global military-expenditure dataset or a 2025 world military-spending total.

As of December 1, 2025, the latest comprehensive SIPRI country-by-country military-expenditure dataset available for a global breakdown was still the dataset covering calendar year 2024.

As of December 1, 2025, the IISS had not yet published The Military Balance 2026 with a new global defence-spending breakdown for 2025 or 2026.

After August 31, 2025, there was no new internationally standardized source that replaced SIPRI’s 2024 actual-spending figures as the main basis for a full global military-spending breakdown.

As of December 1, 2025, U.S. full-year FY2026 defense appropriations had not been enacted as final regular appropriations, so U.S. FY2026 defense numbers remained partly provisional rather than final outlays.

As of December 1, 2025, the United States remained the world’s largest military spender by a large margin, and no post-August 2025 budget development changed that ranking.

Russia’s 2026 federal budget process after August 31, 2025 planned explicit “National Defense” spending below the extraordinary 2025 peak while still leaving Russian defense spending historically very high.

The post-August 2025 Russian 2026 budget plans did not mean that Russia’s actual 2025 military expenditure had already fallen below its 2024 level.

Ukraine’s 2026 state budget adopted after August 31, 2025 allocated a majority of central-government spending to security and defense functions.

After August 31, 2025, Ukraine’s military-spending outlook remained highly dependent on foreign military aid and in-kind transfers that are not fully captured by Ukraine’s domestic defense-budget line.

Germany’s 2026 federal budget process after August 31, 2025 raised planned defense-related spending substantially, with regular defense appropriations supplemented by off-budget or special-fund financing.

France’s draft 2026 budget presented after August 31, 2025 kept France on the path of rising defense appropriations under its 2024–2030 military programming law.

The United Kingdom’s post-August 2025 fiscal updates did not create a new final 2025 global military-spending dataset; they affected forward-looking UK defense-spending plans rather than completed global expenditure totals.

Post-August 2025 European defense-budget announcements mainly changed 2026-and-later planned spending, not the already measured 2024 global military-expenditure breakdown.

Taiwan announced after August 31, 2025 a large multi-year special defense budget in addition to its regular defense budget, materially raising its planned defense-spending path.

South Korea’s post-August 2025 budget process proposed a notably higher 2026 defense budget than its 2025 level.

Japan had not finalized its FY2026 defense budget by December 1, 2025, so any Japanese FY2026 figure available then was still a request or proposal rather than a completed budget outcome.

China did not publish a new annual national defense budget after August 31, 2025 and before December 1, 2025 that superseded its previously announced 2025 defense-budget figure.

India did not publish a new Union Budget defense allocation after August 31, 2025 and before December 1, 2025 that superseded its FY2025–26 defense allocation.

Saudi Arabia’s post-August 2025 fiscal documents were relevant to forward-looking 2026 defense spending, but they did not provide a finalized 2025 actual military-expenditure figure comparable to SIPRI’s annual outturn data.

No post-August 2025 development made nominal defense-budget authority, cash appropriations, and SIPRI-style military-expenditure outturns interchangeable measures for a global spending breakdown.

A correct December 1, 2025 breakdown of global military spending needed to distinguish final historical spending data from provisional 2025 estimates and 2026 budget plans.


Give me a valuation estimate for Anthropic.

In September 2025, Anthropic announced a $13 billion Series F financing round.

Anthropic’s September 2025 Series F financing was priced at a $183 billion post-money valuation.

Anthropic disclosed in September 2025 that its annualized revenue run rate had surpassed $5 billion.

Anthropic disclosed in September 2025 that Claude Code had surpassed $500 million in annualized run-rate revenue.

Anthropic agreed in September 2025 to a $1.5 billion settlement of the Bartz v. Anthropic authors’ copyright class action.

The Bartz v. Anthropic settlement had received final court approval by December 1, 2025.

In October 2025, Google announced an expanded cloud-compute agreement with Anthropic.

Google’s October 2025 Anthropic agreement included access to up to one million Google TPUs.

Google’s October 2025 Anthropic agreement made Google Anthropic’s exclusive cloud-compute provider.

In November 2025, Microsoft announced plans to invest up to $5 billion in Anthropic.

In November 2025, Nvidia announced plans to invest up to $10 billion in Anthropic.

In November 2025, Anthropic announced a $30 billion commitment to purchase Azure compute capacity.

The November 2025 Microsoft-Nvidia-Anthropic announcement disclosed a fixed post-money valuation for the new Microsoft and Nvidia equity investments.

Amazon announced a new equity investment in Anthropic between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Anthropic had completed an initial public offering by December 1, 2025.

Anthropic released Claude Sonnet 4.5 after August 31, 2025.

Anthropic released Claude Haiku 4.5 after August 31, 2025.

Anthropic released Claude Opus 4.5 before December 1, 2025.

OpenAI completed a secondary share sale in October 2025 valuing OpenAI at about $500 billion.


Has Canadian agriculture been damaged by the Trump presidency?

Canada's September 1, 2025 tariff rollback removed Canadian counter-tariffs from U.S. goods that qualify under CUSMA/USMCA.

As of December 1, 2025, Canadian goods claiming CUSMA/USMCA preferential treatment remained exempt from Trump's country-specific tariff on Canada.

As of December 1, 2025, Canadian agricultural shipments lacking CUSMA/USMCA qualification could still face Trump's country-specific tariff on Canadian imports.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, the Trump administration imposed a new tariff aimed specifically at Canadian agricultural products.

In late October 2025, President Trump announced that he was terminating trade negotiations with Canada over Ontario's anti-tariff advertisement.

In late October 2025, President Trump publicly announced an additional 10 percent tariff on Canadian imports in response to Ontario's anti-tariff advertisement.

By December 1, 2025, the United States and Canada had signed a new trade agreement eliminating Trump's 2025 tariffs on Canadian imports.

The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in November 2025 over the legality of Trump's IEEPA-based tariffs.

As of December 1, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court had issued a final decision invalidating Trump's IEEPA-based tariffs.

As of December 1, 2025, the federal appeals court ruling against many IEEPA-based tariffs had not stopped collection of those tariffs.

The formal U.S. public-consultation process for the 2026 USMCA/CUSMA review was active during November 2025.

As of December 1, 2025, the 2026 USMCA/CUSMA review had already been completed.

U.S. dairy industry submissions in the fall 2025 USMCA/CUSMA review sought greater access to Canada's dairy market.

By December 1, 2025, Canada had agreed through the USMCA/CUSMA review process to dismantle its dairy supply-management system.

China's 75.8 percent provisional anti-dumping duties on Canadian canola seed remained in effect as of December 1, 2025.

China lifted its 2025 canola-related duties on Canadian agricultural products before December 1, 2025.

China's 2025 canola-related duties on Canadian agricultural products were U.S. tariffs enacted by President Trump.


Has the Chinese real estate market crashed recently?

By December 1, 2025, the latest official NBS national real-estate investment and sales data covered October 2025.

The NBS October 2025 70-city home-price release showed most tracked cities recording month-on-month declines in new-home prices.

The NBS October 2025 70-city home-price release showed most tracked cities recording month-on-month declines in resale-home prices.

The NBS September 2025 70-city home-price release showed most tracked cities recording month-on-month declines in resale-home prices.

The NBS October 2025 70-city home-price release did not report a double-digit month-on-month fall in new-home prices in any tracked city.

The NBS data released in November 2025 showed January-October 2025 national real-estate development investment below its January-October 2024 level.

The NBS data released in November 2025 showed January-October 2025 residential real-estate investment below its January-October 2024 level.

The NBS data released in November 2025 showed January-October 2025 commercial-housing sales by floor area below their January-October 2024 level.

The NBS data released in November 2025 showed January-October 2025 commercial-housing sales by value below their January-October 2024 level.

The NBS data released in November 2025 showed January-October 2025 new construction starts by floor area below their January-October 2024 level.

The NBS data released in November 2025 showed January-October 2025 completed housing floor area below its January-October 2024 level.

The NBS data released in November 2025 showed end-October 2025 commercial housing floor space for sale above its year-earlier level.

The NBS data released in November 2025 showed January-October 2025 funds available to real-estate development enterprises below their January-October 2024 level.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, Chinese authorities did not announce a blanket central-government guarantee of all real-estate developers' public bonds.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, Chinese authorities did not announce a central-government purchase of all unsold commercial housing inventory.

By December 1, 2025, official NBS national property data for November 2025 had not yet been released.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, China's official housing data supported the interpretation of a prolonged downturn rather than a sudden new nationwide price crash.


Has the recent success of LLMs increased interest in linguistics degrees?

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no newly released sector-wide higher-education dataset measured 2025-26 enrollment in linguistics degree programs.

IPEDS had not published 2025-26 U.S. enrollment counts by linguistics CIP code by December 1, 2025.

HESA had not published 2024-25 UK student-enrolment counts by linguistics subject by December 1, 2025.

UCAS had not published full 2025 end-of-cycle UK acceptances by linguistics subject by December 1, 2025.

Common App fall 2025 application-trends releases did not report linguistics as a standalone intended-major category.

No national admissions report released between September 1 and December 1, 2025 showed that applications to linguistics degrees rose because of LLMs.

No peer-reviewed study published between September 1 and December 1, 2025 established a causal effect of LLM popularity on applications to linguistics degree programs.

The Linguistic Society of America did not release a post-August 2025 report quantifying an LLM-driven increase in linguistics major declarations.

The Modern Language Association did not release a post-August 2025 report showing that ChatGPT caused a rise in U.S. linguistics-degree enrollment.

NCES did not publish post-August 2025 data showing a fall-2025 surge in U.S. linguistics majors.

UCAS did not report in autumn 2025 that UK applications to linguistics courses had increased by double digits because of LLMs.

HESA did not report before December 1, 2025 that UK linguistics enrollments had rebounded because of generative AI.

Post-August 2025 evidence on LLM-driven interest in linguistics degrees remained more anecdotal than nationally representative.

By December 1, 2025, the strongest available post-cutoff evidence did not support a quantified causal claim that LLM success had increased overall demand for linguistics degrees.


Have any major news outlets been discredited recently?

In November 2025, the BBC faced a major credibility scandal over a Panorama documentary that misleadingly edited Donald Trump’s January 6, 2021 speech.

In November 2025, BBC Director-General Tim Davie resigned after criticism connected to the BBC’s editorial standards and the Trump Panorama editing controversy.

In November 2025, BBC News CEO Deborah Turness resigned after criticism connected to the BBC’s editorial standards and the Trump Panorama editing controversy.

By December 1, 2025, the BBC had publicly apologized for the misleading Trump Panorama edit.

By December 1, 2025, the BBC had acknowledged that the misleading Trump Panorama edit created the impression that Trump had made a direct call for violent action.

By December 1, 2025, the BBC had agreed to pay Donald Trump financial damages over the Panorama editing controversy.

In October 2025, Ofcom found that the BBC breached UK broadcasting rules over the Gaza documentary Gaza: How to Survive a Warzone.

Ofcom’s October 2025 ruling on Gaza: How to Survive a Warzone criticized the BBC for failing to disclose that the documentary’s child narrator was the son of a Hamas official.

By December 1, 2025, the BBC had been criticized in the same broad editorial-standards controversy for coverage involving Trump, Gaza, and other politically sensitive topics.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, the BBC was the clearest example among major Western news organizations of a major outlet suffering a new, high-profile credibility crisis.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no comparable post-cutoff scandal forced the top editorial leadership of The New York Times, The Washington Post, CNN, Reuters, the Associated Press, or The Guardian to resign.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no major post-cutoff finding established that Reuters or the Associated Press had fabricated a major international news story.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no major post-cutoff finding established that The New York Times had fabricated a major news story.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no major post-cutoff finding established that CNN had fabricated a major news story.

As of December 1, 2025, the BBC scandals supported the claim that the BBC had recently been seriously embarrassed and criticized, but not the claim that all BBC journalism had been formally discredited.

As of December 1, 2025, the main new evidence for a major outlet being recently discredited concerned specific BBC editorial failures rather than a broad collapse in trustworthiness across all major news outlets.


Have there been any notable port closures in southeast Asia?

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, at least one Southeast Asian port or port system experienced a temporary closure or official vessel-movement suspension.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, Southeast Asia experienced a region-wide shutdown of commercial ports.

Typhoon Bualoi caused temporary port closures or official vessel-movement suspensions in Vietnam in late September 2025.

Typhoon Kalmaegi caused temporary port closures or official sea-travel suspensions in the Philippines in early November 2025.

Typhoon Kalmaegi caused temporary port closures or official vessel-movement suspensions in Vietnam in early November 2025.

Typhoon Fung-wong caused temporary port closures or official sea-travel suspensions in the Philippines in November 2025.

Philippine storm-related port suspensions in November 2025 stranded thousands of passengers at ports.

Vietnam’s notable post-August 2025 port closures were concentrated in coastal provinces affected by tropical cyclones.

Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Yantian port suspensions during Typhoon Ragasa were Southeast Asian port closures.

The Port of Singapore was fully closed for multiple days between September 1 and December 1, 2025.

Port Klang was fully closed for multiple days between September 1 and December 1, 2025.

Tanjung Priok was fully closed for multiple days between September 1 and December 1, 2025.

Laem Chabang was fully closed for multiple days between September 1 and December 1, 2025.

The notable Southeast Asian port closures after August 31, 2025 were permanent closures.

The notable Southeast Asian port closures after August 31, 2025 were caused mainly by tropical-cyclone safety restrictions.


Have there been any recent breakthroughs in treating colon or pancreatic cancer?

After August 31, 2025, the randomized ALASCCA trial reported that daily aspirin reduced colorectal-cancer recurrence after curative-intent treatment in patients whose tumors had PI3K-pathway alterations.

The ALASCCA trial tested aspirin as an adjuvant strategy for nonmetastatic colorectal cancer rather than as therapy for metastatic colorectal cancer.

The ALASCCA trial enrolled colorectal-cancer patients without selecting for PI3K-pathway tumor alterations.

As of December 1, 2025, aspirin did not have an FDA-approved colorectal-cancer treatment indication based on the ALASCCA results.

As of December 1, 2025, the ALASCCA results did not establish aspirin as a treatment for all colon-cancer patients regardless of molecular profile.

At ESMO 2025, updated BREAKWATER phase III results supported first-line encorafenib plus cetuximab plus mFOLFOX6 for BRAF V600E-mutant metastatic colorectal cancer.

The BREAKWATER colorectal-cancer regimen was shown after August 31, 2025 to benefit patients with pancreatic adenocarcinoma.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, the FDA approved a new systemic therapy specifically for pancreatic adenocarcinoma.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, the FDA approved a KRAS G12D inhibitor for pancreatic adenocarcinoma.

As of December 1, 2025, RMC-6236 remained an investigational therapy for pancreatic cancer.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, phase III data established RMC-6236 as a new standard second-line therapy for metastatic pancreatic cancer.

As of December 1, 2025, no personalized mRNA vaccine had regulatory approval for pancreatic adenocarcinoma.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, no randomized phase III pancreatic-adenocarcinoma trial reported a practice-changing overall-survival benefit for a new systemic regimen.

As of December 1, 2025, Tumor Treating Fields had not received FDA approval for locally advanced pancreatic adenocarcinoma.

As of December 1, 2025, botensilimab plus balstilimab was not FDA-approved for microsatellite-stable metastatic colorectal cancer.


Have there been any updates to a possible timeline for a manned mission to Mars?

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, NASA did not announce an official launch date for its first crewed Mars mission.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, no national space agency announced a binding plan to launch humans to Mars before 2030.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Elon Musk continued to describe SpaceX’s first crewed Mars landing as dependent on successful uncrewed Starship Mars landings first.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, SpaceX’s public Mars timeline still centered on sending uncrewed Starships during the 2026 Earth-Mars launch window.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, SpaceX did not launch a Starship mission toward Mars.

As of December 1, 2025, SpaceX had not demonstrated on-orbit Starship propellant transfer.

As of December 1, 2025, SpaceX had not flown any humans on Starship.

SpaceX conducted Starship Flight 11 after August 31, 2025.

Starship Flight 11 did not demonstrate a crewed Mars mission capability.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, NASA did not revise its official planning to make a crewed Mars landing a 2020s mission.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, NASA continued to frame human Mars exploration as following major Artemis lunar milestones.

As of December 1, 2025, Artemis II had not launched.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, NASA raised concerns about delays in SpaceX’s Artemis lunar lander work.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, NASA did not announce that Artemis delays had accelerated the schedule for a crewed Mars mission.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, China did not announce a new official target date for landing humans on Mars before 2030.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, no successful Mars surface landing by Starship occurred.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, no crewed Mars mission passed a final governmental authorization milestone comparable to a funded launch commitment.

As of December 1, 2025, the most concrete near-term Mars timeline update remained SpaceX’s aspirational uncrewed-then-crewed Starship sequence rather than a government-approved crewed mission schedule.


Help me decide whether I should travel to Mexico or Argentina.

As of December 1, 2025, the U.S. State Department travel advisory for Argentina was Level 1: Exercise Normal Precautions.

As of December 1, 2025, the U.S. State Department travel advisory for Mexico was Level 2: Exercise Increased Caution.

As of December 1, 2025, the U.S. State Department classified Colima, Guerrero, Michoacán, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas as Do Not Travel states in Mexico.

Argentina reinstated a reciprocity fee for U.S. tourist passport holders between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Mexico introduced a new visa requirement for U.S. tourist passport holders between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Mexico introduced a new COVID-19 testing requirement for inbound tourists between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

Argentina introduced a new COVID-19 testing requirement for inbound tourists between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

President Javier Milei’s La Libertad Avanza won the largest national vote share in Argentina’s October 26, 2025 legislative elections.

Argentina’s October 26, 2025 legislative election result was followed by a rally in Argentine financial markets.

The U.S. Treasury announced a roughly $20 billion currency-swap or stabilization support arrangement for Argentina in October 2025.

Argentina’s official October 2025 month-over-month inflation rate was higher than Mexico’s official October 2025 month-over-month inflation rate.

Argentina’s October 2025 legislative elections were cancelled because of nationwide unrest.

Early October 2025 floods and landslides in Mexico killed more than 50 people.

The worst early October 2025 flooding in Mexico was concentrated in Veracruz, Hidalgo, Puebla, San Luis Potosí, and Querétaro.

The deadly early October 2025 flooding in Mexico was concentrated in the Cancun and Riviera Maya resort corridor.

Hurricane Melissa made landfall in Mexico in late October 2025.

Cancun International Airport had an ongoing long-term closure on December 1, 2025 because of fall 2025 storms.

The November 2025 killing of Uruapan mayor Carlos Manzo in Michoacán sparked protests and renewed attention to security risks in that part of Mexico.

As of December 1, 2025, no nationwide airline or airport strike was in progress in Argentina.

As of December 1, 2025, the 2025 Atlantic and eastern Pacific hurricane seasons had ended.


How are Chinese domestic regulatory priorities shifting?

The CCP 20th Central Committee held its Fourth Plenum in October 2025 and approved recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan covering 2026–2030.

The October 2025 Fourth Plenum elevated technological self-reliance and “new quality productive forces” as core domestic policy priorities for the next five-year-plan period.

The October 2025 Fourth Plenum signaled a broad retreat from state-led industrial policy in favor of laissez-faire market allocation.

The October 2025 Fourth Plenum framed domestic regulation around both high-quality development and national security rather than around short-term growth maximization alone.

The revised Anti-Unfair Competition Law entered into force on October 15, 2025.

The revised Anti-Unfair Competition Law strengthened the legal basis for policing online and platform-based unfair competition.

After August 31, 2025, Chinese regulators continued to emphasize “anti-involution” enforcement against disorderly price competition and excess-capacity dynamics in sectors such as electric vehicles and solar power.

By December 1, 2025, Chinese authorities had abandoned fair-competition and anti-monopoly enforcement as priorities for internet platforms.

Mandatory rules on labeling AI-generated synthetic content took effect in China on September 1, 2025.

China’s AI-generated-content labeling rules require regulated providers or platforms to attach machine-readable or visible labels to covered synthetic content.

China’s September 2025 AI-labeling regime exempted all AI-generated text from labeling obligations.

Late-2025 Chinese regulatory signals treated artificial-intelligence governance as a compliance and content-traceability issue as well as an industrial-development priority.

Late-2025 domestic regulatory messaging paired support for the private economy with stronger expectations around compliance, fair competition, and payment discipline.

Late-2025 Chinese policy communications made expansion of domestic demand and construction of a unified national market less important than export growth alone.

As of December 1, 2025, late-2025 Chinese regulatory policy did not signal a return to a pre-2020-style permissive leverage model for property developers.


How are Italian luxury brands performing compared to the broader luxury goods market?

Bain & Company and Altagamma’s November 2025 luxury study forecast that the global personal luxury goods market would decline in 2025.

Bain & Company and Altagamma’s November 2025 luxury study described 2025 as another year of pressure on the personal luxury goods market rather than a broad-based recovery year.

LVMH reported slight organic revenue growth at the group level for the third quarter of 2025.

LVMH’s Fashion & Leather Goods division remained in year-on-year organic decline in the third quarter of 2025.

Kering reported a year-on-year comparable revenue decline for the third quarter of 2025.

Gucci remained in double-digit year-on-year revenue decline in Kering’s third-quarter 2025 results.

Bottega Veneta posted positive year-on-year comparable revenue growth in Kering’s third-quarter 2025 results.

Prada Group reported year-on-year retail sales growth at constant exchange rates for the first nine months of 2025.

Miu Miu remained the main growth engine within Prada Group in the first nine months of 2025.

The Prada brand grew much more slowly than Miu Miu in Prada Group’s first-nine-months 2025 results.

Brunello Cucinelli reported double-digit year-on-year revenue growth for the first nine months of 2025.

Brunello Cucinelli’s post-August 2025 updates supported a full-year 2025 growth outlook stronger than the broader personal luxury goods market forecast.

Salvatore Ferragamo reported a year-on-year revenue decline for the first nine months of 2025.

Ermenegildo Zegna Group reported a year-on-year revenue decline for the third quarter of 2025.

Moncler Group’s post-August 2025 trading update did not show double-digit year-on-year revenue growth at the group level.

Armani remained a privately held company without public quarterly results comparable to listed luxury peers as of December 1, 2025.

Prada’s acquisition of Versace had not contributed to Prada Group’s reported 2025 sales as of December 1, 2025.

Post-August 2025 company updates showed stronger performance at Prada Group and Brunello Cucinelli than at Ferragamo and Zegna.

Post-August 2025 evidence supported a view of uneven performance among Italian luxury brands rather than uniform outperformance by the Italian luxury sector.


How are US Universities reacting to a rapidly changing job market for their graduates?

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, multiple U.S. universities publicly expanded AI-literacy training for students outside computer science majors.

In fall 2025, U.S. university career-readiness messaging increasingly treated generative-AI competence as an employability skill.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, multiple U.S. university career centers promoted AI-based tools for résumé review, cover-letter drafting, interview practice, or job matching.

In fall 2025, U.S. university career centers commonly warned students to verify AI-generated job-application materials before submitting them.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, U.S. universities generally abandoned academic-integrity rules governing student use of generative AI.

NACE released its Job Outlook 2026 employer survey after August 31, 2025.

NACE’s fall 2025 Job Outlook 2026 survey was a current data source universities could use to assess employer demand for the Class of 2026.

Handshake released fall 2025 reporting on early-career recruiting for the Class of 2026.

Handshake’s fall 2025 reporting identified student concern about AI’s impact on entry-level work as a salient issue in the college job market.

By December 1, 2025, U.S. universities were responding to weaker entry-level hiring by encouraging students to begin career preparation before senior year.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, multiple U.S. universities emphasized internships, co-ops, micro-internships, practicums, or applied projects as a response to employer demand for work-ready graduates.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, multiple U.S. universities expanded employer partnerships aimed at aligning curricula with hiring needs.

By December 1, 2025, U.S. universities had largely stopped promoting experiential learning because AI had made internships obsolete.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, multiple U.S. universities expanded short-form credentials, certificates, or microcredentials tied to labor-market skills.

By December 1, 2025, microcredentials had replaced bachelor’s degrees as the primary credential offered by most U.S. universities.

In fall 2025, universities’ responses to graduate labor-market change extended beyond STEM fields.

By December 1, 2025, most U.S. universities had eliminated liberal-arts majors as their main response to the changing job market.

The White House announced a $100,000 payment requirement tied to many new H-1B petitions in September 2025.

The September 2025 H-1B announcement increased the need for universities to update career guidance for international students seeking U.S. employment.

The September 2025 H-1B announcement had no relevance to U.S. universities’ advising of international students.

OpenAI announced the OpenAI Jobs Platform and OpenAI Certifications in September 2025.

OpenAI’s September 2025 jobs-and-certifications announcement was part of the broader pressure on universities to explain how degrees relate to AI-era skills credentials.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, there was no single federal mandate requiring all U.S. universities to redesign curricula around AI-era employment.

In fall 2025, U.S. universities’ reactions to the changing graduate job market were institution-specific rather than a coordinated national policy.

By December 1, 2025, multiple U.S. universities were using outcomes, return-on-investment, or first-destination data more prominently in messaging to students or families.


The United States and China reached a new trade de-escalation understanding after the Trump-Xi meeting in South Korea in late October 2025.

As of December 1, 2025, the late-2025 U.S.-China trade de-escalation was a temporary truce rather than a comprehensive permanent trade agreement.

The additional 100% tariff on Chinese goods that President Trump threatened in October 2025 was in force on December 1, 2025.

By December 1, 2025, the United States had reduced the fentanyl-related tariff on Chinese imports from 20% to 10%.

China suspended the new rare-earth export-control measures it announced in October 2025 for one year after the late-October trade understanding.

The October 2025 Chinese rare-earth measures were a major trigger for the renewed U.S.-China trade escalation before the late-October truce.

China resumed purchases of U.S. soybeans in November 2025 after the late-October trade understanding.

U.S. officials said the late-October 2025 understanding included Chinese commitments to buy large volumes of U.S. soybeans through 2026 and later years.

China had fully completed the soybean purchase volumes announced by U.S. officials by December 1, 2025.

The United States suspended implementation of its September 2025 Entity List affiliates rule for one year as part of the late-October trade understanding.

The late-October 2025 trade understanding removed all U.S. export controls on advanced semiconductors and AI chips to China.

The United States and China imposed reciprocal port-fee measures on each other’s vessels in October 2025.

The United States and China agreed after the late-October 2025 talks to suspend reciprocal port-fee measures for one year.

China suspended or reduced some retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods in November 2025 after the late-October understanding.

The U.S.-China tariff truce that was due to expire in November 2025 was extended rather than allowed to lapse.

As of December 1, 2025, U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods remained substantially higher than before the 2025 tariff escalation.

The late-October 2025 U.S.-China understanding restored normal pre-trade-war tariff treatment between the two countries.

U.S. and Chinese negotiators reached a preliminary framework in Malaysia in late October 2025 before the Trump-Xi leaders’ meeting.

U.S.-China talks in Madrid in September 2025 produced a framework for resolving the TikTok divestiture issue.

As of December 1, 2025, the TikTok divestiture framework had not eliminated broader U.S.-China technology and trade tensions.

China launched trade or regulatory actions targeting U.S. semiconductor firms in September 2025.

As of December 1, 2025, the late-2025 U.S.-China trade relationship was best characterized as stabilized by a fragile truce rather than normalized.


How do European wealth managers currently feel about the US stock market?

Since September 1, 2025, major European wealth-manager outlooks have generally described the US equity market as expensive by historical valuation standards.

As of December 1, 2025, European wealth-manager commentary has generally not called for clients to exit US equities wholesale.

Since September 1, 2025, European wealth managers have commonly framed their US equity stance as selective rather than indiscriminately bullish on the whole market.

Since September 1, 2025, AI-related earnings growth has remained a central reason European wealth managers cite for retaining exposure to US equities.

Since September 1, 2025, concentration in a small group of US mega-cap technology stocks has been a prominent risk cited by European wealth managers.

As of December 1, 2025, most major European wealth managers have viewed US equity valuations as a reason to temper return expectations.

Since September 1, 2025, European wealth-manager commentary has commonly treated prospective or actual Federal Reserve easing as supportive for US equities.

As of December 1, 2025, European wealth managers have generally not treated a near-term US recession as their base case.

Since September 1, 2025, currency exposure to the US dollar has remained a material consideration for European clients investing in US equities.

Since September 1, 2025, some European wealth managers have recommended hedging at least part of US dollar exposure for euro, sterling, or Swiss-franc-based clients.

As of December 1, 2025, European wealth managers have generally preferred quality large-cap US companies over highly leveraged or low-quality US equities.

Since September 1, 2025, several European wealth managers have encouraged geographic diversification away from relying solely on US equities.

As of December 1, 2025, European wealth-manager commentary has generally not characterized the US stock market as cheap relative to Europe.

Since September 1, 2025, concerns about an AI bubble have become a recurring caveat in European wealth-manager discussions of US stocks.

As of December 1, 2025, most European wealth managers have not made US small-cap stocks their clear preferred segment over US mega-cap technology stocks.

Since September 1, 2025, US political and trade-policy uncertainty has remained a risk factor cited in European wealth-manager assessments of US equities.

As of December 1, 2025, the prevailing European wealth-manager view of US equities has been cautious or constructive-cautious rather than outright bearish.

Since September 1, 2025, European wealth-manager optimism toward US equities has depended more on earnings resilience than on multiple expansion alone.


In September 2025, at least one frontier AI system was reported to reach gold-medal-level performance on the 2025 ICPC World Finals problems.

OpenAI announced after August 31, 2025 that one of its reasoning systems achieved gold-medal-level performance on the 2025 ICPC World Finals problems.

Google DeepMind announced after August 31, 2025 that Gemini 2.5 Deep Think achieved gold-medal-level performance on the 2025 ICPC World Finals problems.

The reported AI systems at the 2025 ICPC World Finals were official university teams in the ICPC standings.

The 2025 ICPC AI results primarily measured algorithmic programming-contest performance.

The 2025 ICPC AI results primarily measured natural-language olympiad proof writing.

Google announced Gemini 3 Pro in November 2025.

Google's November 2025 Gemini 3 Pro benchmark report listed an AIME 2025 score above 90 percent.

Google's November 2025 Gemini 3 Pro benchmark report listed a MathArena Apex score below 50 percent.

Google's November 2025 Gemini 3 Pro benchmark report listed a lower percentage score on MathArena Apex than on AIME 2025.

Google announced Gemini 3 Deep Think in November 2025.

Gemini 3 Deep Think was generally available to all free Gemini users on December 1, 2025.

OpenAI released GPT-5.1 in November 2025.

OpenAI's GPT-5.1 announcement presented a complete solution of the FrontierMath benchmark.

Anthropic released Claude Sonnet 4.5 after August 31, 2025.

Anthropic's Claude Sonnet 4.5 was marketed primarily as a specialized formal-mathematics prover.

Anthropic released Claude Haiku 4.5 after August 31, 2025.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no public post-cutoff result established that a generally available model could solve most FrontierMath problems unaided.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no AI system received an official IMO medal at a newly held IMO competition.

Post-August 2025 results removed the need to distinguish informal mathematical answer generation from formally verified proof production when evaluating AI math ability.


How has the American antivax movement evolved?

After August 31, 2025, Florida officials announced a plan to eliminate all state vaccine mandates, including school-entry vaccine mandates.

By December 1, 2025, Florida had not fully repealed every statewide school-entry vaccine mandate.

After August 31, 2025, California, Oregon, and Washington announced a West Coast public-health alliance to issue vaccine guidance independent of the CDC.

After August 31, 2025, multiple Democratic-led states began issuing their own vaccine recommendations because they no longer treated CDC guidance as sufficient on its own.

After August 31, 2025, major U.S. medical organizations issued vaccine guidance that diverged from federal vaccine policy under HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr.

In September 2025, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. faced bipartisan criticism in a U.S. Senate hearing over his vaccine-policy changes and CDC leadership turmoil.

In September 2025, former CDC Director Susan Monarez testified that she was removed after refusing demands related to ACIP vaccine recommendations.

After August 31, 2025, CDC vaccine-policy turmoil caused temporary confusion at pharmacies over access to updated COVID-19 vaccines.

In September 2025, the reconstituted ACIP replaced broad routine COVID-19 vaccine recommendations with an individual-decision-making framework.

In fall 2025, the CDC adopted ACIP’s individual-decision-making framework for COVID-19 vaccination.

In September 2025, ACIP recommended against using the combined MMRV vaccine as the first measles-mumps-rubella-varicella dose for young children.

In September 2025, ACIP removed the recommendation that newborns receive a hepatitis B vaccine dose at birth.

By December 1, 2025, the federal childhood immunization schedule still included a hepatitis B birth-dose recommendation.

After August 31, 2025, federal vaccine deliberations under Kennedy expanded beyond COVID-19 vaccines to longstanding childhood vaccines.

In November 2025, the CDC changed its public-facing language on vaccines and autism to retreat from the categorical statement that vaccines do not cause autism.

By December 1, 2025, the CDC website stated that the claim that vaccines do not cause autism was not evidence-based.

After August 31, 2025, the Trump administration promoted acetaminophen use during pregnancy as a possible autism-related concern.

After August 31, 2025, federal health officials used autism policy to broaden the antivaccine-aligned “MAHA” agenda beyond vaccine mandates alone.

By December 1, 2025, the U.S. antivaccine movement had gained more direct influence over federal vaccine advisory and communications institutions than it had before September 2025.

By December 1, 2025, federal health agencies had restored the pre-2025 CDC vaccine-advisory structure and reversed Kennedy’s ACIP overhaul.

By December 1, 2025, the United States had not lost its measles-elimination status.

After August 31, 2025, fall vaccine-policy disputes accelerated a split between federal vaccine guidance and guidance from states, pharmacies, and professional societies.


How is AI reshaping the logistics industry?

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Amazon announced Blue Jay, an AI-enabled robotic system for warehouse picking and consolidation.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Amazon announced Project Eluna as an agentic AI system intended to assist fulfillment-center operations managers.

Amazon’s fall 2025 AI-robotics announcements showed that the company was still deploying AI primarily inside fulfillment centers rather than replacing its parcel-delivery network with fully autonomous delivery vehicles.

By December 1, 2025, Amazon had not eliminated its large U.S. seasonal warehouse hiring program despite increased use of warehouse robotics and AI.

By December 1, 2025, Aurora’s driverless freight service remained limited to selected U.S. freight lanes rather than operating as a nationwide autonomous trucking network.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, the U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration issued a final rule broadly authorizing fully driverless interstate commercial trucking without human drivers.

By December 1, 2025, U.S. autonomous trucking deployments were still concentrated in limited commercial pilots and lane-specific operations rather than broad replacement of human long-haul drivers.

By December 1, 2025, the FAA had not finalized a nationwide beyond-visual-line-of-sight drone rule that would allow routine large-scale autonomous drone delivery without waivers.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, drone delivery in the United States remained more constrained by aviation regulation and local operational limits than by AI capability alone.

By December 1, 2025, major parcel and freight carriers were using AI mainly for routing, forecasting, network planning, warehouse automation, and customer-service workflows rather than for fully autonomous end-to-end logistics.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, there was no major post-cutoff event showing that AI had made human logistics labor broadly obsolete across warehousing, trucking, and last-mile delivery.

By December 1, 2025, the most up-to-date evidence supported a view of AI in logistics as an accelerant of automation and operational optimization rather than an immediate full substitute for logistics networks, drivers, and warehouse workers.


How is Germany spending their enlarged defense budget?

The Bundestag adopted Germany's delayed 2025 federal budget in September 2025.

The 2025 budget adopted in September 2025 kept the regular defense-ministry budget at roughly €62 billion.

Germany's 2025 defense spending plan relied on the Bundeswehr special fund for more than €20 billion of additional military spending.

The autumn 2025 draft for Germany's 2026 federal budget raised the regular defense-ministry budget to more than €80 billion.

Germany's autumn 2025 financial plan projected a regular defense budget of roughly €153 billion in 2029.

Germany's autumn 2025 plans assumed the €100 billion Bundeswehr special fund would remain the main long-term source of defense growth after 2027.

Germany's post-August 2025 defense spending plan relied on borrowing made possible by the constitutional exemption for defense spending above one percent of GDP.

The November 2025 budget process eliminated the defense-spending exemption from Germany's debt brake.

The November 2025 Bundestag budget process preserved multi-billion-euro military aid for Ukraine in the 2026 spending plan.

Autumn 2025 procurement plans included major ammunition purchases for the Bundeswehr.

Autumn 2025 procurement plans included more ground-based air-defense equipment for the Bundeswehr.

Autumn 2025 procurement plans included counter-drone systems as a named spending priority.

In autumn 2025, the Bundestag Budget Committee approved funding for 20 additional Eurofighter combat aircraft.

The autumn 2025 Eurofighter approval replaced Germany's existing order for 35 F-35A aircraft.

As of December 1, 2025, Germany had not signed a firm contract for additional F-35A aircraft beyond the 35 ordered in 2022.

The enlarged autumn 2025 defense plans continued to fund the Arrow 3 missile-defense system.

The enlarged autumn 2025 defense plans continued to fund CH-47F heavy transport helicopters.

The enlarged autumn 2025 defense plans continued to fund F126 frigates.

After August 31, 2025, Germany cancelled the F126 frigate program to redirect naval money to tanks.

Germany's late-2025 defense plans included spending for equipping the new Bundeswehr brigade in Lithuania.

Germany's late-2025 spending plans excluded major land-forces procurement.

The autumn 2025 budget process treated personnel expansion as a funding requirement for the Bundeswehr buildup.


Zohran Mamdani won the November 2025 New York City mayoral election.

Citywide fare-free MTA bus service was in effect in New York City by December 1, 2025.

Between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025, Manhattan Central Business District congestion-pricing toll collection continued.

After August 31, 2025, the federal government announced a hold or freeze affecting federal funding for Second Avenue Subway Phase 2.

After August 31, 2025, the MTA approved a fare-and-toll package that would raise the subway and local bus base fare to $3.00 in 2026.

The subway and local bus base fare had already risen to $3.00 by December 1, 2025.

MetroCard remained accepted for NYC subway and local bus rides on December 1, 2025.

The MTA Board approved a Brooklyn bus network redesign after August 31, 2025.

The redesigned Brooklyn bus network was operating in regular service by December 1, 2025.

NYC student transit benefits for the 2025–26 school year were provided through Student OMNY cards rather than legacy Student MetroCards.

Second Avenue Subway Phase 2 opened for passenger service between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.

The Interborough Express opened for passenger service by December 1, 2025.

Metro-North Penn Station Access service to Penn Station opened for passenger service by December 1, 2025.

No new NYC subway stations opened for passenger service between September 1, 2025 and December 1, 2025.


How is the tech M&A market doing and which sectors are hot?

Global technology M&A deal value in Q3 2025 was higher than in Q3 2024.

Global technology M&A deal count in Q3 2025 was higher than in Q3 2024.

Announced technology M&A value from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025 exceeded the value announced during the same period in 2024.

The U.S. technology M&A market showed stronger deal-value growth than the European technology M&A market from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025.

Mega-deals of at least $10 billion accounted for a larger share of announced technology M&A value from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025 than in the first eight months of 2025.

Private-equity-backed technology acquisitions increased in announced value from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025 compared with the same period in 2024.

Strategic acquirers remained the largest source of announced technology M&A value from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025.

Artificial-intelligence-related companies were among the hottest technology M&A targets from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025.

AI infrastructure assets were more actively targeted in technology M&A from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025 than consumer AI application companies.

Data-center-related acquisitions were a major driver of technology M&A activity from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025.

Cybersecurity was one of the most active technology M&A sectors from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025.

Semiconductor and chip-design assets attracted elevated M&A interest from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025.

Vertical SaaS remained a favored target category for technology acquirers from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025.

Horizontal enterprise SaaS consolidation accelerated from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025 compared with the first eight months of 2025.

Fintech M&A activity was stronger from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025 than during the same period in 2024.

Digital health technology was one of the hottest technology M&A sectors from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025.

Public-to-private technology takeovers by private equity were a notable feature of the market from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025.

Technology IPO-market conditions from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025 reduced pressure on late-stage private technology companies to pursue M&A exits.

Antitrust scrutiny materially delayed at least one major technology M&A transaction from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025.

Regulatory concerns around AI, data privacy, or digital competition were a meaningful factor in technology M&A dealmaking from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025.

Technology M&A valuation multiples from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025 were generally higher than in 2023.

Rising debt-financing availability supported larger leveraged technology buyouts from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025.

Distressed or down-round technology M&A remained common among venture-backed startups from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025.

Cross-border technology M&A activity increased from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025 compared with the same period in 2024.

Acquisitions motivated by AI talent were a recurring feature of technology M&A from September 1, 2025 through November 30, 2025.


After August 31, 2025, South Sudanese authorities formally charged First Vice President Riek Machar with treason-related offenses connected to the March 2025 Nasir violence.

The post-August 2025 charges against Riek Machar also named other senior SPLM-IO figures or alleged associates as co-defendants.

Riek Machar remained under state custody or house arrest through December 1, 2025.

The SPLM-IO rejected the September 2025 case against Riek Machar as politically motivated.

After the September 2025 charges against Riek Machar, the 2018 revitalized peace agreement was widely assessed as being in its most serious crisis since its signing.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, South Sudan did not return to a fully nationwide conventional civil war on the scale of 2013–2018.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, the most important active fighting remained concentrated in parts of Upper Nile and nearby areas rather than in Juba.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, there were continued reports of clashes involving government forces, allied militias, SPLA-IO-linked forces, or White Army fighters.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, civilians continued to be displaced by fighting and insecurity in South Sudan.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, international actors including the UN, AU, IGAD, or Western governments warned that South Sudan risked sliding back into wider civil war.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, there was no final political settlement that restored full cooperation between President Salva Kiir’s camp and Riek Machar’s SPLM-IO.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, no South Sudanese national election was held that resolved the transition established under the 2018 peace deal.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, Juba did not fall to opposition forces.

Between September 1 and December 1, 2025, President Salva Kiir was not removed from power by a coup or battlefield defeat.

As of December 1, 2025, the war’s trajectory was one of escalating political-military fragmentation and localized conflict rather than a stable implementation of the 2018 peace process.


How likely is it that the US white collar workforce declines by 20% or more by the end of 2030?

The BLS preliminary annual benchmark revision released in September 2025 lowered estimated March 2025 total nonfarm payroll employment by roughly 900,000 jobs.

The federal government shutdown in October 2025 delayed publication of several official BLS labor-market data releases.

The official U.S. unemployment rate reported for September 2025 was below 5%.

By December 1, 2025, official post-August 2025 BLS data showed a double-digit percentage decline in U.S. professional and business services employment.

Challenger, Gray & Christmas reported in November 2025 that U.S. employers had announced more than one million job cuts year-to-date in 2025.

Challenger, Gray & Christmas reported that AI was cited for more than 30,000 U.S. job-cut announcements in October 2025.

Amazon announced in October 2025 that it planned to eliminate about 14,000 corporate jobs.

Amazon stated that its October 2025 corporate layoffs were primarily the result of completed generative-AI automation of those jobs.

Target announced in October 2025 that it would cut about 1,800 corporate positions including open roles.

Accenture said in September 2025 that more than 11,000 employees had left under a restructuring connected to AI-related reskilling and efficiency efforts.

Salesforce said in September 2025 that it had reduced its customer-support workforce by roughly 4,000 roles after deploying AI agents.

Nvidia announced in September 2025 that it intended to invest up to $100 billion in OpenAI as part of a 10-gigawatt data-center partnership.

OpenAI completed a secondary share sale in October 2025 that valued the company at about $500 billion.

OpenAI launched AgentKit in October 2025 to help developers build and deploy AI agents.

OpenAI launched ChatGPT Atlas in October 2025 as a browser with ChatGPT integrated into browsing workflows.

Anthropic released Claude Sonnet 4.5 in September 2025.

Google released Gemini 3 in November 2025.

OpenAI released Sora 2 after August 31, 2025.

California enacted SB 53 in September 2025 to impose transparency and safety-reporting obligations on large frontier-AI developers.

A major U.S. federal statute became law between September 1 and December 1, 2025 that broadly prohibited employers from using AI to automate white-collar work.